PSU Got What
They Wanted, But Not What They Paid For
-By Eileen Morgan
An engagement letter defines the legal
relationship (or engagement) between a professional firm, a law firm in this
case, and its client. The PSU/Freeh Engagement
Letter1 details the hiring of Freeh, Sporkin, and Sullivan, LLP (FSS)
to perform legal services and act as legal counsel for the Penn State Board of
Trustees’ Task Force (Task Force).
LEGAL REPRESENTATION
The contract
reveals that Freeh had been engaged to ‘represent the Task Force.’ The engagement letter clearly specifies throughout
the document that ‘legal services’ were to be rendered by Freeh (FSS),
including: page 1, ‘Re: Engagement to Perform Legal Services’; part 1. Scope of
Engagement, Freeh’s law firm will ‘serve as independent, external legal counsel
to the Task Force to perform an independent, full and complete investigation’
and will provide a report that ‘will contain FSS’s findings concerning: i)
failures that occurred in the reporting process; ii) the cause for the
failures; iii) who had knowledge of the allegations of sexual abuse; and iv)
how those allegations were handled.
FSS’s report also will provide recommendations to the Task Force to
ensure that those failures do not occur again.’ ; page 5, part 5., ‘For
purposes of providing legal services….’; page 5, part 7., ‘FSS will provide the
above-described legal services for the Task Force’s benefits’; page 7, part
10., ‘FSS may terminate its legal services’; and at the bottom of page 7, ‘FSS
is delighted to be asked to provide legal services to the Task Force’ and the
Task Force was invited to call Freeh to ‘discuss any matter relating to (their)
legal representation.’
Why did the Board
of Trustees’ Task Force need additional legal counsel and representation? The Board of Trustees had already brought in the
firm of Reed Smith to handle the Board’s legal affairs in relation to the
Sandusky matter and its aftermath. Why would
PSU spend millions of additional dollars on a second law firm in November 2011
to investigate possible criminal matters (i-iv above) when the state of
Pennsylvania had already charged Tim Curley and Gary Schultz with criminal
wrongdoing and the investigation was underway and in the hands of the judicial
system? After all, Freeh had NO subpoena
power, and Task Force’s Ken Frazier, who oversaw Freeh’s work, acknowledged
that Freeh knew he would be unable to interview ANY of the key witnesses and had
no legal authority in the pending criminal matters.
In
other words, the Pennsylvania courts will lawfully establish the very findings
(i-iv above), if any, that the Penn State Board of Trustees paid Freeh to determine,
the difference being that the Freeh Report could ultimately cost the University
$10 million and is NOT a legally binding document based on indisputable
evidence. The Freeh Report, regarding
the PSU officials’
involvement,
has been substantially refuted and would be thrown out of a court of law based
on the very fact that Freeh’s findings and conclusions are unproven opinions
that relied upon flimsy evidence.
In essence, Freeh could not officially and did not actually render legal counsel or a legally binding report regarding the alleged failures at Penn State, and thus, failed to fully deliver the services paid for as itemized in the engagement letter. If Freeh had truly been serving in the capacity outlined in the letter of engagement, the University would never have allowed him to pontificate as he did in a nationally-televised and sensational press conference without the benefit of the Board having even read his report.
In essence, Freeh could not officially and did not actually render legal counsel or a legally binding report regarding the alleged failures at Penn State, and thus, failed to fully deliver the services paid for as itemized in the engagement letter. If Freeh had truly been serving in the capacity outlined in the letter of engagement, the University would never have allowed him to pontificate as he did in a nationally-televised and sensational press conference without the benefit of the Board having even read his report.
A PLAN FOR VINDICATION
So why did
Penn State agree to pay for a multi-million dollar report instead of waiting
for the courts to LEGALLY determine if there was knowledge of sexual abuse and
if there were failures of reporting that abuse, in accordance with the law? Since Freeh’s report would have no legal
standing and the courts would have the final say, it appears the Board essentially
hired Freeh to produce an unofficial report that would vindicate their highly controversial
terminations of Joe Paterno and Graham Spanier on November 9, 2011.
First, Freeh
was clearly representing the Board
of Trustees, as indicated twice on page 1.
On page 2, Freeh’s team was ‘under the sole direction of the (Board’s) Task
Force,’ meaning the Task Force ‘supervised, guided, and/or managed’ the actions
of the investigation and possibly ‘gave explicit instruction(s)’ to Freeh. On page 5, part 7., Freeh provided his legal
services for the ‘Task Force’s benefit.’
In addition, the two parties would ‘consult one another’ during the
investigation, as necessary, as indicated on page 6, line 1. And finally,
Freeh’s team was ‘looking forward to working with the Task Force.’ Based on this description of a mutual working
relationship and Freeh’s legal representation of the Task Force, it begs the
question: How could Freeh possibly ‘perform an independent investigation’ as
promised? Independent means ‘not
influenced or controlled by others; not subject to another’s authority or
jurisdiction.’ Freeh obviously did not
perform an independent investigation, but rather, was under the authority of
the Task Force who could control the content of the report. Therefore, Freeh failed again to deliver the
services paid for as itemized in the engagement letter.
CALCULATED RESULTS
The results
from the investigation were to be provided in a written report per the Scope of
Engagement. Remarkably, this report seemed
to have predetermined results before the investigation even began. Notice that Freeh is certain of what the
report will contain. FFS discloses that ‘the report will contain FSS’s findings concerning:
i) failures that occurred in the reporting process; ii) the cause for the
failures; iii) who had knowledge of the allegations of sexual abuse; and iv)
how those allegations were handled.
FSS’s report also will provide
recommendations to the Task Force and Trustees for actions to be taken to
attempt to ensure that those and similar failures do not occur again.’ Freeh was careful to address the ‘sexual
abuse’ as alleged since those charges
were pending at the time, even though all of the other aspects of his planned
“investigation” were more definitive, making no use of the word “alleged.” And on
page 2, Freeh states that ‘any
discovered evidence of criminality’ and ‘if
any victims of sexual crimes’ are identified, they ‘will be reported to
appropriate authorities.’ Here, Freeh
discusses his course of action ‘if’ he finds certain data. However, as previously mentioned regarding the
Scope of Engagement, he did not say his report ‘will contain any findings
determined’ or ‘if findings are determined.’
Clearly, Freeh differentiates between what he might find and what he
will find.
On the date
of this contract, November 18, 2011, Freeh seemingly guarantees to the Task
Force that his future report will
contain findings concerning the failures of the Penn State Officials in
reporting sexual abuse, the cause for those failures, who had knowledge and how
did they handle that knowledge. He also
guarantees his report will provide
recommendations to ensure those failures
do not occur again. This is amazing
foresight by Freeh since he did not actually know at the time if there even was
a confirmed report of sexual abuse, let alone if there were indeed failures in
reporting it.
Although
Freeh states at the top of page 6 that his team ‘does not promise any result’ he
claims they ‘will make every reasonable effort to provide specific
results.’ It is apparent, from the Scope
of Engagement, that many of the findings of the Freeh Report, which was
publicly released on July 12, 2012, had been premeditated from day one. The results the Board wanted, regarding the
top PSU officials, were apparently the results they were going to get. Since the criminality of any wrongdoing by
individuals was being handled by the judicial system, there seems to be only
one motivational factor to pay millions of dollars for an unsubstantiated
report: To justify the Board’s reckless and impetuous decisions to terminate
Paterno and Spanier.
Trustee Kenneth Frazier’s recent statement2 appears to confirm the Board’s need for
a predetermined outcome: “I believe that we are entitled to look at the words
and contemporaneous emails and other documents that draw the conclusions that we need to draw as a university.” What conclusions
did the Board need to draw as a
university? The courtroom will determine
the factual findings once and for all.
All the Board needed to do was
to be responsible stewards of the University, exercise patience, and allow the
legal system to establish the ruling regarding the Penn State officials.
INSURANCE
What’s even
more fascinating is that the Penn State Board of Trustees indemnified Freeh and
his team for ALL costs, expenses, and judgments, including any amounts paid in
settlement of ANY claims. It was
actually a brilliant plan. The Trustees
ostensibly paid Freeh millions to publish a report with (unsubstantiated) findings
that legitimized their rash decisions of November 9, 2011, and by indemnifying him, provided Freeh with unbridled freedom to publicly spew
fallacious and slanderous statements about Paterno, Spanier, Curley and
Schultz. Essentially, Freeh had carte
blanche to produce findings and conclusions, regardless of truth, that would substantiate
the Board’s previous actions without the liability of being sued. By protecting Freeh from the fallout of lawsuits,
the Task Force could contrive the results they desired while relieving Freeh of
any accountability. Should there be any
legal action taken against Freeh and his firm, should there be any judgments
against Freeh, and should Freeh have to spend any time defending himself to the
University or the public, the tab for all of his bills will generously be
picked up by Penn State.
FREEH’S FAILURES ARE THE BOARD’S
VICTORIES
Freeh’s
failure to perform an independent investigation allowed the Task Force,
overseen by Frazier and Corbett’s Secretary of Education Ron Tomalis, to
supervise the probe. And, Freeh’s failure
to deliver a report that was legally binding allowed the Task Force to acquire
what seemed to be its ultimate goal: exoneration for the Board. This truly was a match made in heaven.
1http://www.scribd.com/doc/129799160/Freeh-Engagement-Letter
2Ken Frazier’s statement at the Penn State Board of Trustees Legal & Compliance Committee Meeting, Hershey, PA-March 14, 2013
1http://www.scribd.com/doc/129799160/Freeh-Engagement-Letter
2Ken Frazier’s statement at the Penn State Board of Trustees Legal & Compliance Committee Meeting, Hershey, PA-March 14, 2013